Discusión:Asamblea de Clérigos Combatientes

«Izquierda islámica»

Aporto referencias que atestiguan la expresión «izquierda islámica» dentro del análisis del campo político iraní postrevolucionario, aplicada a las corrientes reformistas derivadas fundamentalmente de los «estudiantes de la línea del Imam» (con protagonismo particular en la toma de la embajada estadounidense en 1979), cuyos principales responsables políticos fueron Mir Hosein Musaví como primer ministro entre 1980 y 1988 y, tras las presidencias de Rafsanyaní rebautizados como «reformistas», el presidente de la república Mohammad Jatamí. La Asamblea de Clérigos Combatientes ha sido desde la primera etapa una de las principales organizaciones de esta corriente, aunque su importancia declinó a partir de los años 90. Desde la victoria de Jatamí en 1997 hasta años recientes, la organización central de esta tendencia fue el Frente de Participación del Irán Islámico (جبهه مشارکت ایران اسلامی).

• The "reform faction," as it is currently constituted, is an umbrella term that captures several types of coalitions and convergences of interests. One such collective of groups can be described as the "Islamic left". Here, left wing does not refer to a preference for state-run economies (although the Khatami reformists tend to be more statist in their outlook than Rafsanjani supporters, possibly because of lingering socialist influences). Rather it refers to a desire for a faster pace of reform and challenging the authority of the Supreme Leader. The left wing argues that the development of Iran is principally impeded by the state's failure to expand freedom and access to political participation. This is, in their view, an important bottleneck in the Iranian political structure. They contend that a minority, which is unaccountable to the people, monopolizes power and fails to deliver opportunities for the Iranian people. The Islamic Left is made up of several groups, such as the Combatant Clerics Society, headed by Mehdi Karubi; the Organization of Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, headed by Pehzad [sic] Nabavi; and the Islamic Participation Front of Iran, headed by Mohammad Reza Khatami. In general, these groups work well together and share many goals and objectives. De Angel Rabasa, Matthew Vaxman, Eric V. Larson, Cheryl Y. Marcum, The Muslim World After 9/11.

• The Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF), one of the largest reformist parties in Iran, was founded in 1998 by mid-career politicians who were leading members of Mohammad Khatami’s campaign in the 1997 presidential elections. Many of the party’s founders were leading reformists of the late 1990s, who had earlier been radical members of the “Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Line” (...) After the hostage crisis, the group continued to be active in the lower ranks of the Islamic leftist faction. Like other leftist elites in the Islamic Republic of Iran, an emphasis on social justice and anti-imperialism characterizes the main features of their political mindset. De la ficha sobre el Frente de Participación en un portal sobre Irán de la Universidad de Princeton.

• ORIGINS: THE ISLAMIC LEFT. Khatami and his allies were the remnants of the Islamic left faction, hardliners who from 1979 to 1989 were the driving force behind many of the IRI’s signature policies. Domestically this included violently eliminating the political opposition to the IRI, enforcing strict Islamic morality through revolutionary committees and nationalizing Iran’s economy. In foreign policy they were behind the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran and were instrumental to the founding of Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the first decade of the IRI they had been strongly backed by the Valiy-e Faghi or Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and governed through the Executive under then Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi (1981-1989). --- After the end Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), fall of the Soviet Union, the death of Khomeini, political stabilization of the regime through mass-purging of the opposition and social change, the Islamic left’s fortunes precipitously declined. First, the termination of the war ended the state of emergency under which the Islamic left had become accustomed to operating. Second, the collapse of Soviet Union delegitimized the very basis of their statist economic ideology which had been used to govern Iran’s economy for the first decade of the IRI. Third, the passing of Khomeini, a staunch supporter of the Islamic left, deprived them of the main foundation of their political power. Fourth, the elimination of political opposition through mass-executions, imprisonment and exile meant that the regime was now relatively stable and their brand of political authoritarianism and strict religious morality was no longer necessary. Finally, Iranian society had profoundly changed demographically, with a huge baby-boom during the war and many of the children of the revolution beginning to come of age. In short, the conditions which had enabled the Islamic left’s first decade in power simply no longer existed. Their rivals, the Islamic right faction, capitalized on this by selecting their own Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the new supreme leader and Rafsanjani as president, eliminating the Premiership from the constitution, veto-ing Islamic left election candidates through the Guardian Council, purging them from unelected state institutions, and more. Having been eliminated from the system, the Islamic left entered a period of retreat in which it reassessed its place in the regime. The emerged from this process “reformed”, the namesake of their faction. De este artículo sobre los orígenes del Movimiento reformista iraní.

• Many clerics owned large tracts of land and hence supported a capitalist economy. Those merchants in the bazaar were also in favor of limited government interference and a hands-off economic approach. Rafsanjani, a wealthy landowner, pushed for a free market economy both while in Parliament and as president. These conservatives were opposed by the Islamic left, which wanted the government to take an active role in helping the poor in society. Those on the Islamic left, such as Mousavi, argued that the government should play an assertive role in directing the economy. The Islamic left won some early economic policy debates as some major Iranian industries were nationalized in the early 1980s. Rafsanjani's liberal economic approach would gradually play a large role in Iran's economy..., de Barbara Ann Rieffer-Ianagan, Evolving Iran: An Introduction to Politics and Problems in the Islamic Republic.

• In 1988, some members of the Islamic left, including Mohammad Khatami, split off from JRM to form Majma-e-Ruhaniyun e Mobarez (MRM) [Combatant Clerics Society]. MRM espuses more personal and economic freedom and implicitly opposes the degree of control the religious establishment exercises in the current system. (...) The Islamic left is revolutionary; it challenges the authority of the Supreme Leader and all the religious bodies. The Islamic left argues that the Supreme Leader derives his authority and legitimacy to rule from populist and democratic support rather than only from a religious mandate. This faction emphasizes the need for the Supreme Leader to be responsive to the people instead of being authoritarian. For this to occur, the left argues, the regime must be able to adapt its religious rulings to the modern, changing world. In contrast to the conservative, traditional interpretation f the Supreme Leader's role, the Islamic left believes that the powers of the leader should be restricted by the wishes of the public. The implication embedded in the Islamic left's vision for the country is that the governing and bureaucratic institutions should have more authority that the religious institutions. De Keith W. Crane, Rollie al, Jeffrey Martini, Iran's Political, Demographic and Economic Vulnerabilities.

• The reform movement that emerged within the Islamic system in the 1990 was a second ideological shift with important repercussions for the status of private industrial entrepreneurs. It sprang out from the ranks of the Islamic left, which during the lifetime of Khomeini had been the most ardent promoter of the doctrine of velayat-e faqih. By insisting that the will of the Leader was superior to the authority of republican institutions, they had asserted themselves in the country's political system at the expense of the more law-abiding and democratic currents. In the early 1990s, however, the radicals were themselves excluded from the electoral game as the then president Rafsanjani made a tactical alliance with the conservatives to marginalize opponents of liberal economic reforms. De Negin Nabavi, Iran: From Theocracy to the Green Movement

Aunque hay muchísimas más en libros especializados (basta con introducir en el buscador islamic left iran, o islamic left combatant clerics), creo que estas referencias (que además reflejan interpretaciones diversas) bastan para demostrar la pertinencia del término (y la inclusión de esta organización concreta en la corriente de la izquierda islámica) dentro del contexto iraní, espero que no haga falta traducir. En persa hay lógicamente mucha más literatura. En español por desgracia el material sobre Irán más allá del periodismo superficial y más o menos propagandístico es prácticamente NULO. Revierto a la situación anterior al cambio sin fundamento argumental sobre la realidad política iraní. --Afrasiab بفرمایید قربان 20:35 17 jun 2013 (UTC)

Añado sobre «¿Cómo va a ser izquierda si es islámica/religiosa?»: al margen de que todo movimiento político en un contexto determinado tiene sus contradicciones, ya se considere izquierda o derecha, véase el artículo aquí en wikipedia sobre Socialismo árabe. En el mundo arabo-islámico (Irán no es árabe más que en una pequeña minoría pero entra en el conjunto), las corrientes de izquierda rara vez se han posicionado directamente en contra de la religión, aún de gran importancia para la inmensa mayoría de la población. No por eso deja de hablarse de socialismo árabe. Considerar que la expresión es abusiva es un punto de vista defendible y legítimo desde una opción ideológica particular, pero no es la única perspectiva legítima, y las expresiones son válidas aunque sea de modo convencional y para referirse a grupos concretos, máxime cuando lo hacen los mismos grupos implicados y sus oponentes políticos en su campo de acción.--Afrasiab بفرمایید قربان 20:47 17 jun 2013 (UTC)

Bien, hasta cierto punto estoy de acuerdo, pero sigue habiendo un problema y es que el que entre a leer esto seguramente no esté muy puesto al día o sea un especialista en todo esto. Por tanto, puede malinterpretar lo que hay. Por eso daba y mantengo mi argumentación.--Manuchansu (discusión) 16:15 18 jun 2013 (UTC)

Es un argumento. A ver si te gusta el cambio que he hecho precisando en la introducción que estamos hablando de una historia y un contexto político particulares. Enlazo a un articulo que queda por crear sobre el concepto y las fuerzas sociales y políticas que se identifican como izquierda islámica en Irán, aunque yo de momento no tengo tiempo para meterme en un asunto tan polémico, sobre todo porque aunque la denominación existe y hace referencia a unas fuerzas políticas determinadas, como se ve en esos libros y artículos el sentido y la definición varía, en función probablemente de la orientación ideológica de los autores: que si se define por el autoritarismo o no, por el apoyo al velayat-e faqih o la crítica al poder clerical, que si el bando conservador opuesto es más democrático y respetuoso de la ley, según un autor... cuando en su etapa reformista uno de los eslóganes centrales de esa izquierda islámica es justamente el respeto a la ley, será por relación de fuerzas y control del aparato judicial... ya son interpretaciones personales. Saludos.--Afrasiab بفرمایید قربان 16:48 18 jun 2013 (UTC)